Table of Contents

The following lists of the hundred largest employers in German business in 1907, 1938, 1973, and in 1995 are offered as a working tool for business historians. Though not perfect, employment as a yardstick with which to measure the largeness of corporations is considered to have an advantage over other measures like turnover, market-value of capital, or assets. The figure of employement is timeless, independent of distinct accounting practices and changing currencies and suitable to international comparison. The applied method is described in detail. For all the figures in the lists the sources are cited in order to indicate the degree of exactness or to facilitate corrections. The four lists clearly demonstrate the wellknown trend towards concentration in twentieth century German big business, and provide evidence on the likewise familiar shift from manufacturing to services.

Untertitel: Eine Untersuchung auf der Grundlage von Aktenbeständen im zentralen Staatsarchiv PotsdamThe IG Farben as the most important representative of the German external economic expansion had regarded Egypt as a very potent market. Thanks to its dominating position within the international dyestuffs cartel and the activity of an IG-owned sales office it succeeded in controlling Egyptian dyestuffs market. With its high quality dyestuffs and a careful analysis of the local conditions IG Farben developed flexible methods to meet the demand and to penetrate the Egyptian market. No doubt that IG with this policy supported objectively the efforts of the Misr-Trust for building up a modern textile industry. When fascism came to power a modified economic policy of the new German government at first favoured the further expansion of the IG Farben in the Egyptian market, but the beginning of World War II led to a complete stop of all IG Farben activities in Egypt.

The Egyptian arable land is highly dependent on artificial supplies of fertilizers especially of nitrogen-fertilizer as a result of the perennial irrigation. As Egypt hardly had any plants for the production of artificial fertilizers at that time, the demand for fertilizers was met by imports. The Chilean saltpeter producers were the traditional suppliers but since the middle of the twenties they were subject to the increasing competition from the expanding German nitrogen industry which was unified in the German Nitrogen Syndicate founded in 1919. The high quality of German nitrogen fertilizers, the system of their own sales organisations, and expanding publicity were successful: After bitter price fights the opponents came to an agreement which led to the dominance of the German Nitrogen Syndicate together with its English and Norwegian partners on the Egyptian market. The German-English-Norwegian group could successfully maintain its monopoly position against the other European or US-American nitrogen producers until the outbreak of World War II.

The paper surveys the current debate on central bank independence and points to some of the open questions. There is a broad consensus on the economic and political advantages of an autonomous central bank but less is known about the background of such an institution. Even though the question is of some importance, the theoretical literature has little to say about the forces of institutions that enable a government to effectively commit itself to central bank independence. The empirical literature is much better equipped to reveal the effects of central bank autonomy then to uncover its determinants. Two of the reasons are that the present discussion more or less restricts itself to law-based cross-country studies and that it ignores the time dimension. In both respects qualitative and economic-history methods could help to solve some of the remaining theoretical and empirical problems.

In this essay the author tries to present the beginning and further development of the life-reform colony of Eden next to Berlin. This institution was one of the most influential, authoritative and successful attempts to realize the complex ideas of the \"back to the nature\" - movement (anti alcoholism, nature cure, vegetarianism, land and agrarian reform), which increased in the last period of the nineteenth century parallel to the German industrialisation. As a conclusion of different elements of reforming life style Eden was founded in 1893 (18 founders) with an idealistic programme of collective ownership, cooperative society and vegetarian nutrition. Because of financing and organising difficulties a special banking system, established in 1895 was responsible for the financing of the further extension of Eden and other congenial projects. The spheres of economical activities (vegetables- and fruit-growing, processing plantation, distribution to individual reformators and health food stores) based on the endeavour of independence of the industrialized society. Eden was a spiritual and practical centre of life-reform for more than 40 years and is today - after moving to Frankfurt in West Germany - one of the leading health food producers.

The founding of the Gerling-group. The «outsider» Robert Gerling, the «Feuerkartell», and the niche in the market. The article deals with the first 20 years of the Gerling group\'s history. In 1904, Robert Gerling established his first insurance broker\'s office in Cologne and focused exclusively on the industrial sector. A severe conflict followed between the «outsider» and the so-called «Feuersyndikat», which was a well established cartel of the German fire-insurance companies. The conflict ended with Gerling\'s full victory and the cartel\'s breakdown in 1924, for Gerling was able to exploit the crisis of the hyperinflation in an extremely flexible way. For the first time it was possible to use all sources from the Gerling archives.

Untertitel: Eine empirische Untersuchung zum Problem der «Bankenmacht»Bank representatives sitting on supervisory boards of German non-bank corporations are often seen as a proof of the banks' dominance over industry. This article examines the composition of German supervisory boards in I927, that is, before restrictions on the composition of boards were imposed. The study is based on a data bank consisting of all German joint stock companies with a shareholders' capital of not less than nom. 500,000 RM. From this basis six company samples are made up, representing («old» as well as «new» and more as well as less capital intensive industries. Although the number of bank representatives is indeed very large both in the aggregate and in all company samples - on average one out of three seats Is occupied by bankers - it is argued that this must not be interpreted as an empirical proof of the bank dominance thesis. Instead, since in only very few cases only one bank was represented, the large number of competing banks on the boards is seen as evidence that the management of the majority of non-bank enterprises were able to secure injections of funds in case of need without damaging their entrepreneurial autonomy.

Research on German foreign direct investment (FDI) has not yet reached Anglo-Saxon standards. Because of the important commitment of the German economy to exports - the exportquota used to be between 20-30% - scholars would expect a considerable amount of FDI. But the 1913 figure of 153 producing subsidiaries abroad (counted only the producing ones) by one branch of industry is quite a surprise. The main investment boom took place after the turn of the century. The First World War caused a set back to the standards of the 1890's but reinvestment was carried out very early. In spite of this the war caused a clear cut in enterprise strategy. After 1918 most industrialists went abroad reluctantly and only if they felt forced to do so. Here IG Farben is a good example. The distinction by product groups shows a considerable variety: not all and everything is concentrated in the traditional stronghold of German chemistry (dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals), but in 1913 even more investment was in chemicals and fertilizers. Even a group of cosmetics etc. was to be found, while investment in raw-material was very little. A special examination of the dyestuffs group shows that FDI clearly substituted exports. In most cases the reason for investment was state interference (customs, patents, preferences etc.) while the dynamics of markets abroad alone caused little development. This attitude was changed to a certain extent after the war; which again underlines the great impact of this event on enterprise strategy in Germany. An additional comparison with Swiss chemical FDI shows that this new hesitating attitude was not only a German specialty.

This contributions builds upon a similar one published in this journal 10 yeras ago; in both cases only producing establishments were counted (all fdi would at least tenfold the figures). Though faced with a second expropiation of its foreign direct investment (1918 and 1945) German chemical industry did not held back in investing abroad again. Thus it achieved the remarkable number of (at least) 189 producing units abroad in 1965. The geographical destination changed profoundly compared 1930 and 1960. Since Europe was thought to recover only with difficulties, fdi was allocated primarily in perceived growth-regions such as Latin America, or the Middle East. This was changed to the benefit of Europe at the end of our period. As before, the strong sectors of German chemical industry (e.g. dyestuffs) were the first to invest, however, followed closely by new growth sectors such as plastics and fibres.

During World War II, the French iron and steel industry had to produce for Germany under the yoke of extremely strict controlling measures. Nevertheless, this did not prevent the formation of certain direct bonds which were based on relations of long standing between the industries of the two countries. Initially, the war completely upset these relations and allowed the German iron and steel industry to realize great ambitions: namely, to reclaim property and patents lost after World War I, to acquire shares of French firms or to extend existing shareholdings. All these actions were aimed to build up a durable influence on that part of the French economy and to exert control over it. In reality, the French companies were subject to a double control, military and civilian, the latter being placed under the responsibility of directors or engineers from major German iron and steel firms. Although the companies in charge of this technical inspection made some very good profits from it, their presence could result in mitigation of the human and material difficulties of the occupation. We can also notice a variety of commercial relations between French and German firms, reaching from rather traditional transactions to proposals for co-operation and joint investments. Moreover, the Nazi government encouraged meetings between industrialists. The companies of the occupied zone were quickly annexed to the German cartels in order to the seize on their production. That, however, lead to their more or less equal treatment within the German market and in dealing with supply problems. In spite of the terrible conditions imposed by the occupation, the contacts between the steel manufacturers of the two nations were revived very soon after the war. As early as 1946, French employers considered the German steel manufacturers as natural partners again with whom relations should be normalized. The first official contacts took place within the International Chamber of Commerce and the OEEC. Thus, in spite of the very painful conditions that the French iron and steel industry experienced during the war, the bonds were not completely broken. We can make the assumption that the forced relations during the war did not constitute an insurmountable obstacle to the fast normalization of these relations in the first post-war period.

Untertitel: Eine Bank zwischen Eigentümer- und nationalen WirtschaftsinteressenThe collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy marked a watershed for the development of financial markets and banking systems in central Europe. The successor states of the Monarchy tried to establish own financial systems soon after their independence. In the First Czechoslovakian Republic a special legislation of nostrification should weaken the position of investors and banks from abroad, especially from Austria. A reorganisation of a large number of business and financial institutions, whose majority of shares belonged to foreign capital groups before autumn 1918, was the consequence of this nostrification initiated by the Czechoslovakian government in 1919. This procedure took place for one of the greatest banks in Prague, the Böhmische Escompte-Bank, in summer 1919. What measures were undertaken, what were the motivation and strategies of the most prominent actors, what were the results oft the intended nostrification of the Böhmische Escompte-Bank?

The cyclical period 1873-1894 has been made the «Great Depression» by the wellknown theses of H. Rosenberg causing a lively debate still lasting today. Taking business records (balance sheets, commented annual reports) of the Chemische Fabrik Griesheim, being at hand to a substantial amount for this period, this paper wants to look at the business policy of just one firm, but one which was leading in its field at that time. Of course, these figures can\'t replace overall economic data, yet they can very well point out the basic conditions of the branch and thus can be a part of the overall cyclical development. The figures of that period 1870-1891, i.e. the intercompany overall results (balance sheet total, capital stock, guarantee fund, gross sales returns, profit balance, dividends, rate of return) as well as the production show that you can\'t speak of a «Great Depression» for the Chemische Fabrik Griesheim, and not even of a «Great Stagnation» as has often been done in the overall cyclical analyses. The company results show a positive trend with a high correlation. No year after 1870 a loss had to be given account of. Nevertheless setbacks, switches to other products, and falling off company results (1 87 5/76; 1883/84) could be seen, yet they were followed by improving results right away. It is obvious that especially the structural conditions of the chemical industry were responsible for these weaker periods. Innovations and growth processes disturbed the production and marketing field that had just become stable and resulted in price collapses and a growing competition. Nevertheless the company didn\'t lose courage at any time and displayed a willingness and an ability to grow. These results show that it is dangerous to look for general trend analyses in a period in which older industries with a lower growth rate existed alongside never growth-orientated industries. Furthermore they show how dangerous it is if you want to come to certain epochs and to an overall historical theory without cautions differentiation and an exact quantification.