The article gives a summarizing account on the history of the Swiss pension system. The system, praised by the World Bank and the OECD for its financial stability, is based upon the three pillar of state benefits, occupational and private pensions. Focusing on the occupational and private pillars the article distinguishes three periods: the early era of occupational pensions between 1900 and 1931, the period between 1931 and 1972, when the occupational system rapidly expanded whereas the establishment of the state\'s scheme was first delayed until 1948 and then inhibited in its growth, and the third period after 1972 with the official recognition of a three pillar system and the public promotion of occupational and private pension schemes. The article also points out the limitations of the Swiss model, like the modest level of state benefits, causing a comparably high level of old-age poverty, or the inequalities of the occupational pension system, particularly the discrimination of part-time and low-wage earners.

The end of an automobile company – Borgward’s bankruptcy and Bremen politics. The collapse of the Borgward company in early 1961 was not only a shocking moment forBremen, but for the entire German automobile industry. The circumstances of the largest bankruptcy of a German company at the time have repeatedly been subject to debate, especially concerning suspicions and accusations about who was to blame. Those responsible in Bremen politics at the time have especially been the focus of attention and criticism since then. The following study aims to show that grave mistakes within the management of Borgward, such as wrong choices concerning corporate strategy, excessive production- and sales-costs and an antiquated style of leadership, were responsible for the bankruptcy, not Bremen’s politicians. This highlights that a scientifically ambitious historical revision of the Borgward-bankruptcy needs to review new aspects of the story rather than following the approach of previous studies in order to not fall victim to conspiracy theories or ill-founded suspicions.

The end of an automobile company – Borgward’s bankruptcy and Bremen politics. The collapse of the Borgward company in early 1961 was not only a shocking moment for Bremen, but for the entire German automobile industry. The circumstances of the largest bankruptcy of a German company at the time have repeatedly been subject to debate, especially concerning suspicions and accusations about who was to blame. Those responsible in Bremen politics at the time have especially been the focus of attention and criticism since then. The following study aims to show that grave mistakes within the management of Borgward, such as wrong choices concerning corporate strategy, excessive production- and sales-costs and an antiquated style of leadership, were responsible for the bankruptcy, not Bremen’s politicians. This highlights that a scientifically ambitious historical revision of the Borgward-bankruptcy needs to review new aspects of the story rather than following the approach of previous studies in order to not fall victim to conspiracy theories or ill-founded suspicions.

Untertitel: Der Niedergang der westdeutschen Bekleidungsindustrie in den 1960er/70er JahrenUnnoticed Disappearance - The Decline of the West-German clothing Industry in the 1960s/70s In the beginning of the 20th century German clothing used to be a considerable producer of consumer goods, manufacturing clothes for both home and export market. In the 1960s and 70s this branch of the German industry began to decline, mainly due to the pay gap between the labor costs in Germany and low-wage-countries located in Eastern Europe and Asia. In response to this development bigger German companies outsourced their production abroad to save labour costs. Smaller companies often lacked the needed financial resources and had to face bankruptcy as result. At the end only services like planning and quality control remained in Germany. In consequences of this development a lot of German seamstresses lost their jobs. The government did not care about these problems; the enterprises did not receive subsidies. The unions in the sector were weak due to a high perecentage of working women and the high ratio of small and medium sized regionally dispersed enterprises.

The billion dollar deal between Hoechst and the chemical industry in the GDR in 1976 In May 1976, Hoechst AG and its subsidiary Uhde entered into a contract with the GDR for the construction of a a chlorine PVC production plant valued at more than DM 1 billion. It was the largest German-German plant construction in the chemical industry. This business harbored mainly financial risks for the GDR, since only part of the sum could be paid for the deliveries of products from the new plant to Hoechst. Hoechst was itself a large producer of PVC and tried to protect it's own markets against competitors from the GDR by means of contractually agreed blacklists. The plants built by Uhde GmbH were put into operation in 1980 by the VEB Kombinat Chemische Werke Buna, Schkopau. They were based, as was customary at that time, on the amalgam process in which mercury was used. About half of the chlorine and PVC prodcution in Schkopau continued to be produced in old, dilapidated facilities, some of which were from wartime. In one section, where mercury-containing sludge from the chlorine electrolysis of the old and the new plant was processed, only processed, only prisoners were active. The management board of Hoechst AG was not aware of this. Business with the GDR was discussed only in economic terms, but not in moral terms

Untertitel: Zum Marketingkonzept des Schocken Konzerns in der Weimarer RepublikThe First World War and the Hyperinflation of the early 1920s threw the German retail trade into a serious crisis. After the currency stabilization of 1924 many companies tried to increase revenues and reduce overheads by focusing more on the demands of the customers. One measure taken most notably by some large companies was to build central advertising orientation of the textile retail trade by using the example of the department store group Schocken. The new business strategy of Schocken was accompanied by a similar corporate philosophy and was based on the principle of «objectivity in distribution ». This principle affected their range of goods, their architecture and decoration of the shops, their customer service and their advertising strategy.

Untertitel: Eine Studie über das erste Jahrzehnt des französischen Automobilismus«L\'Automobilisme» originated as an «elite sport» in France at the end of the 19th century. This is a well-known fact in the history of technology. Despite this the connection between sport, industry, and society has never been precisely studied. In doing so, the following article shows that the racing circuit was a clever propaganda making deviced by the noble and upper-middle-class Automobile Club de France (ACF) which first put the demand for automobiles on a toll. Within a few years, however, the extremely lucrative PR concept for the successful firms led to its own form of absurdity: the ever faster and more expensive cars moved beyond the needs of average owners, and the population gradually felt itself outraged by the behaviour of the «speed merchants». Even if the idols of chivalrous and heroic amateur racing retained their prestige, the French automobile industry had to bid its adieu to the racing paradigm during the early years of the 20th century. Criteria, such as safety and comfort, joined speed in the forefront of car production. Racing events lost their initial hegemony of importance evolving into a mere subculture.

Untertitel: «Volksprodukte» in Politik, Propaganda und Gesellschaft des «Dritten Reiches»In the Third Reich a group of «people’s products» was initiated, among them the «Volksempfänger», a radio receiver, the «Volkswagen», and the «Volkskühlschrank», a refrigerator. These «people’s products» could be interpreted as an attempt to establish a particular Nazi version of a consumer society. The article gives an overview of the various initiatives for «people’s products» and explains their failing. The concept of «people’s products» has its roots before the Nazi regime in the 1920ies. It represents the people’s wishes for a better life as well as industrial firms’ hopes to market greater quantities of goods. The Nazi government overtook the concept and adapted it to its political and ideological issues of population, race, «Volk», «Lebensraum», and autarchy. «People’s products» became defined as cheap goods and services of high quality for the broad masses being initiated by NS politics and communally produced by industry or party- and state-owned companies. In consequence, private firms were forbidden to use the term for their own products. Industry and trade cooperated with Nazi organizations in the design, production and marketing of «people’s products», above all, because they were afraid to lose control in the consumer goods market. However, in several cases, low prices and large series which were prescribed by politics, threatened the central business goals, namely the companies’ existence and profits. In such cases as with the Volkswagen, the firms risked conflicts with Nazi politics and withdrew from the projects. The projects were overtaken by Nazi organizations. The «people’s products» main Nazi proponents were Goebbels’s ministry of propaganda and Ley’s Labour Front. The two institutions represented the concept’s two important goals. On the one hand, it should win the German people for the regime. On the other hand, it should supply the German «Volk» with the standard of living which the Nazis believed was appropriate for the «most valuable race». The Nazi consumer society should be realized not by augmenting the income and wages but by extreme production efficiency. This strategy could not be successful because the main hindrance for the consumer goods’ distribution were not the purchase costs but the running costs. Taking that into account, the Nazi concept of «people’s products» can be interpreted as a combination of propaganda and illusion.

Historiography in Czechoslovakia dedicated a lot of attention to several aspects of the industrial revolution, but hasn't studied the emergence and importance of entrepreneurs in this process. Of special importance is the study of the genesis, the social background and the function of entrepreneurs in the ironworks which had an exceptional position in the industrial structure of the Bohemian countries during the industrial revolution. This study wants to close that gap and tries to quantify the main characteristics if possible. The main tasks of this study are: 1. a definition of the social group of entrepreneurs in the Bohemian iron industry from the 1830's to the 1870's. 2. the structure of entrepreneurship 3. the social and professional background of the individual entrepreneurs and the top executives with the exception of joint stock companies. Special reference is paid to the changes in the relations between the aristocratic and the common entrepreneurs, as far as possible in comparison with other countries.

Untertitel: Der Versuch einer RekonstruktionThe long-term orientation of family businesses is particularly evident in crises. The example of the Gebrüder Bethmann bank in Frankfurt am Main, whose state of crisis began during the First World War and continued almost uninterrupted until the 50s, shows how far business families are prepared to go. The essay traces the developments and shows the measures taken by the bank and the banking family to counter the crises and their consequences. It shows that Baron Moritz von Bethmann made himself an instrument of the National Socialists and implemented their policies in associations, societies and companies – particularly with regard to the ousting of Jews from German economic and social life. However, his political role did not help him to run his business more successfully or to preserve his family property. In order to at least preserve Bankhaus Gebr. Bethmann – already almost 200 years old at the time – for the family, he sacrificed almost all of the real estate and land owned by the von Bethmann family. Despite this high price, the bank remained in the family for only one more generation.

The ban on German aviation and the creation/fabrication of it's history The article traces the origins of two central features of the historiography of the German aircraft industry: while its contribution to technical progress by the end of the World War II tends to be grossly exaggerated - particularly in the case of the so-called Wunderwaffen, the jet fighters of Messerschmitt and Heinkel - it's industrial basis and it's role in the German war economy are played down to an impression that, until 1945, the industry consisted of tiny workshops of mere handicraft character. It is shown that this narrative was carefully constructed between 1945 and 1953, highlighted by memoirs of former military leaders of the Luftwaffe Adolf Galland and Werner Baumbach, but predominantely through the memoirs of Ernst Heinkel, the leading industrialist during the Nazi period. These memoirs appeared at a time whgen it seemd unlikely - due to a total ban on German aviation under the Allied occupation - that a German aircraft industry would ever rise again. By exaggerating the German technological lead in 1945 they eased the idea that the industry was outdated when the chances grew for its return to the international market in 1953. Meanwhile, the outright denial of the size of importance of the industry during the war Indirectly provided a chance to gloss over the participatipon of the industrialists in the Nazi crimes, highlighted by the use of concentration camp inmates and slave labourers who formed the bulk of workforce in the production of the Wunderwaffen.

Many studies on business history of Nazi Germany suggest that, after the implementation of the Four Year Plan in 1936, German private industry was directly or indirectly – by macroeconomic policy and regulation – forced to invest according to the regime’s autarky and armament goals. However, as will be shown in this paper based on three case studies on negotiations between the state and private companies in different industrial sectors between 1937 and 1943, there are also several examples, which challenge this interpretation. In the following I will demonstrate that these examples were no exceptions. Furthermore it seems that the macroeconomic framework normally had only a minor influence on companies\' investment decisions in the autarky and armaments sectors. More important were contracts, which shifted investment risks in part or even completely from private industry to the state.

Untertitel: Zur chemisch-pharmazeutischen Forschung bei E. Merck, Darmstadt, ca. 1900 bis 1930The scientific enterprise, Chemical-pharmaceutical research at E. Merck, Darmstadt, ca 1900 to 1930 This article deals with development of academic research within the pharmaceutical firm E. Merck, Darmstadt, between 1900 and 1930. One main purpose is to clarify to what extent the widespread notion is justified that external research gave way for internal research in order to maintain a leading position in innovativeness. Therefore the article analyses the way of co-operation with Adolf Windhaus with regard to vitamin D during the 1920s. The article concludes that internal research was indeed

There was no other question which encumbered the relationship between the Western Allies and the Germans during the founding period of the Federal Republic as much as that of the dismantling of industry. In this, of course, the points of view were diametrically opposed. The Allies always pointed out that the values removed from the West German economic substance, in particular the dismantled plants and factories, were small. But the German side was very pessimistic in its assessment of the chances for its own re-establishment if the dismantling program was really to be carried out to the extent proposed in 1947. However, there were even differences of opinion amongst the Allies. On the one hand, the West Europeans, in particular the British, even in 1948/49, still kept rigidly to the agreed dismantling policy. On the other hand, the European policy of the USA which had established the European Recovery Program held the dismantling policy as a retarding element for its economic and political goals. However, the Western leading power could only implement its plans step by step against the resistance of its European allies. Finally, immediately after the foundation of the Federal Republic the Western powers decided to treat dismantling projects for the further Western integration of the new state. The extent and value of all the industrial dismantling in Western Germany are not yet precisely known. The Inter-Allied Reparation Agency (IARA) in Brussels expected, right up until the end of its activities in 1951, German reparations to total 517 mill. US $ (value 1938) of which only one fourth was derived from dismantled plants. The Allied calculations and other IARA estimations about the value of dismantled plants were vigorously refuted by the Germans who criticized the lack of entire relevant positions such as seized licenses, trade marks, know how etc. The German side attacked in particular the mode of calculating the so-called residual value of the removed plants as the residual value was by far too low and unfavorable for the Germans. With the cessation of the dismantling the controversies among the Allies and the Germans ended. Also the interest of the public vanished. Only recently the German reparations after the Second World War have become the object of historical research, but exact figures of the value of all the dismantling and their effects on the German economy are still missing. This paper aims - apart from a short presentation of the origins of the reparation problem - mainly at reassessing the controversial figures of the value of the dismantled plants in iron and steel industry.

The Beecham Group, now part of the British-based Anglo-American combine, SmithKline Beecham, is the only major UK enterprise which has successfully made the transition from patent medicines to pharmaceuticals. This account of its transition between 1914 and 1970 is given some perspective by the firm's progress being compared with the growth in British output of medicinal products during this period. Evidence on Britain's position in the world's pharmaceutical industry is also presented. As to Beechams, a sequence of chance events from 1914 onwards transferred control of the firm away from the family to two able entrepreneurs in succession, Philip Hill and Leslie Lazell. Hill set up the first laboratory in Beechams, and through a programme of diversification began the production of pharmaceuticals on a small scale, while Lazell actively promoted the development of semi-synthetic penicillins by very considerable R. & D. expenditure.